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The Interpretation of the Scope of Questions Regulable by Collective 
Labour Contracts 
The collective agreement as a specific regulating means makes rules for 
the labour relations of enterprises, however, not for all concerns of labour 
relations but mainly for relations necessary to the achievement of the en-
terprise's purposes. The content of the collective agreement is regulated in 
the Labour Code by the following method: on the one hand it determines 
within the group of norms referring to the institution of collective agree-
ment also the content of such agreement on a higher level of principle. It 
says: "Collective agreements define —within the sphere and framework de-
termined by provision of law— the rules relating to the rights and obli-
gations of the enterprises and workers as well as principles concerning the 
implementation of such rules."1 
On the other hand the Labour Code and legal rules issued for its imple-
mentation —besides the general definition quoted above— contain factual 
authorizations which elements of the labour relation should be regulated 
by collective agreements namely such legal rules distinguish among the 
content elements: they order the regulation of certain elements compui-
sorily, that of others only as a possibility for the parties concluding collec-
tive agreements. 
Such method for specifying the content of the collective agreement 
needs an interpretation since the views diverge as to the range of questions 
regulable by collective agreements. 
On the basis of checking the contents of the collective agreements made 
in 1968, that is to say concluded instantly after the coming into force of 
the Labour Code, can be stated that the parties concluding collective agree-
ments construed rather largely the range of the questions regulable. From 
some collective agreements emerged even such an extreme point of view 
according to which a collective agreement may regulate all questions not 
being dealt with by legal rules. In this, way several rules of the former 
Labour Code accustomed to by the enterprises got into collective agreements 
during their 16 years' practiice, rules from which the enterprises could not 
easily break away. In addition to that many collective agreements contained 
undertakings characteristic of the years of 1950, prescriptions regarding so-
cialista emulation, etc. 
According to the other explanation —narrowly defining the content 
of the collective agreement—, the collective agreement may only regulate 
1 Para. (1) Section 10 of the Labour Code. 
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factual questions for which the statutory rule contains specific authorization. 
Thus: if the statutory rule does not expressly refer to the regulation by 
collective agreement, in that case the collective agreement may not provide 
any regulation. If for all that the collective agreement gave a regulation, 
such regulation would be void for lack of authorization to be given by 
statutory rule. 
In the beginning there was missing a uniform interpretation of legal pro-
visions concerning the content of the collective agreement also in the prac-
tice of organs authorized to decide on the voidness of provisions contained 
in collective agreements. This is reflected in the opposite views evolved 
relative to a provision of the collective agreement. 
The Territorial Labour Law Court of Arbitration for the Capital Buda-
pest ruled out the provision contained in Section 10 of Chapter III of the 
collective agreement from 1968 of the Servicing Enterprise for Building 
and Construction according to which "the withdrawal of the dismissal 
notice becomes absolute on the consent of the other party" and ordered 
the said enterprise to amend its collective agreement since this contained 
a provision not permitted by a legal rule of higher grade. Namely the 
reasons adduced of the Court say: . . . the regulation and ordering may 
exclusively take place in the limits fixed for this purpose by other statutory 
rules of higher grade . . .2. On the other hand the supervisory organ of the 
enterprise in line with the trade union expressed the following point of 
view about the content of the collective agreement. "It is generally experi-
enced that the collective agreements are not confined to the regulation of 
imperative or dispositive cases specified in the central statutory rules but 
within the framework of the law they draw also such cases into the sphere 
of regulation which the management or the trade union found necessary 
for this purpose. There is only one restriction for such contractual provisi-
ons, namely that the regulation should not infringe statutory rules of 
higher grade or rather it should not violate the law. . . S ince . . . the cont-
ested part of the enterprise's collective agreement does not go beyond the 
limits of the Act or law-decree, the decision of the Court of Arbitration 
erroneously judges that part unlawful and incorrectly makes reference to 
the lack of other legal rule of higher grade."3 
1 do not examine here the relevance of the provision contained in the 
collective agreement and regulating the withdrawal of the dismissal notice. 
The standpoints cited are significant since they clearly express the view 
accepting the narrower or larger conception of collective agreements. 
The guide given for the conclusion of collective agreements is destined 
to help put an end to this uncertainty and develop a uniform interpretation; 
this guide contains as to the question discussed as follows: 
"The collective agreement may not give arrangements but for such 
questions the regulation of which the statutory rules refer to the collective 
agreement, or rather permit such a regulation."4 The wording of the guide 
2 Announcement No. 1608/1968 of the Territorial Labour Arbitration Court 
for the Capital of Budapest. 
» Answer No. 6588/1968 of the Ministry of Building, Housing and Town De-
velopment as well as of the Trade Union of Workers employed in the Industry 
of Building Materials to the announcement No. 1608/1968 of thé Territorial Labour 
Arbitration Court. 
4 Guide to the conclusion of the collective agreements of the years 1971-
1975. Labour Gazette No. 5 of 1971 P. 83, Hereinafter: Guide. 
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cited above —it seems— accepts a narrow interpretation relative to the 
content of the collective agreement. The narrow construction even more 
clearly emerges from the view of László Nagy according to which " . . . the 
collective agreement may give regulation if the Labour Code or other legal 
rule gives an express authorization for that."5 The latter point of view —in 
my opinion— cannot be explained but in the way that the conrete casual 
authorizations have to be considered as taxative enumerations and the 
collective agreement iis not allowed to go beyond such authorizations. 
On continuing the quotations we are convinced of the fact that neither 
the Guide, nor László Nagy narrow down the contents of the collective 
agreements to the case of "express" i. e. explicit authorizations. The Guide 
contains namely further on as follows: "Besides the cases when statutory 
rules ' order the obligatory regulation of certain questions in collective 
agreements, the latter may give regulations in the following cases: 
(a) Where the legal rule does not prescribe an obligatory regulation 
but it renders such regulation possible. 
(b) The collective agreement may regulate, too, when the legal rule 
—without referring to a detailed regulation or definition to be made in the 
collective agreement— uses a general notion having a content different in 
view of the activities, character of the enterprises. 
(c) The collective agreement may make an arrangement also in such 
cases, when the Labour Code or other legal rules fix the framework of a 
right or allotment in limits "from-to" although it makes no reference to 
the fact that the filling of such framework belongs to the sphere of the 
collective agreement."6 
László Nagy has the same opinion in his work entitled "The collective 
agreement in practice" and summarizes his view at the end of his analysis 
as follows: "As to the two completions it must however, be emphasized: 
when the Labour Code or other legal rules do not determine any limits or 
rather do not use any general notions, they may give a regulation in the 
collective agreement if there is an authorization for that."7 
László Nagy in his work issued later even widens the content of the 
collective agreement with a completion. He thinks possible the regulation 
in a collective agreement beyond the foregoing also in those cases when 
the parties "wish to determine a principle of implementation for the pro-
vision contained in the legal rule or in the collective agreement."8 
On summarizing the views quoted in the foregoing it can be stated 
that these take up a position between two extreme opinions. They do not 
admit that the collective agreement may arrange no matter which question 
but at the same time ultimately they do not consider the casual, express 
authorizations of the statutory rule as a taxative enumeration. In order to 
expound my point of view in the discussed question, I have to go back 
to the legal provision defining the content of the collective agreement, and 
5 László Nagy: The collective agreement in practice. Táncsics Publishing 
House. Budapest 1968. P. 12, this author puts it in similar manner in his other 
work with the addition that "thus the collective agreement may not regulate any 
question without the authorization of the statutory rule." László Nagy. System 
and nractice of the collective agreement I.P.13. 
« Guide. P.83. 
7 László Nagy: The collective agreement in practice. I.P.14. 
s László Nagy: System and practice of the collective agreement. Táncsics 
Publishing House. Budapest 1971. P.18. 
it seems advisable to make a thorough study of the casual authorizations 
contained in statutory rules. 
By virtue of para. 10 of the Labour Code quoted above, the collective 
agreement determines the provisions concerning the rights and obligations 
of the enterprise and the workers as well as the principles for implementing 
such provisions in the range and limits specified by statutory rules. It is 
obvious that the expression of the Act "in the range and limits specified 
by statutory rules" denotes the content limits of the collective agreement, 
this definiton, —however—, does not indicate necessarily a narrow inter-
pretation of the content. The expressions "range" and "limits" do not give 
namely but a general delimitation of the content. The word "limit" of the 
contested expressions —in my opinion— signifies that if the legal rule 
determines the maximum or minimum of the rights or rather both of" them, 
— the collective agreement must not exceed such maximum and minimum.8 
Yet the expression "the range specified by statutory rule" has to be 
construed in the way that it covers all questions the detailed regulation of 
which a legal rule of higher gradde did not effect and dit not refer to the 
sphere of a legal rule connected with another labour relation. Thus the 
expression "the range specified by statutory rule" means the range delimited 
by legal rules in indirect way. Had namely the legislation wished to deter-
mine the content narrowly, it should have regulated it expressly, clearly by 
the help of another terminology. Would we object to such reasoning the 
question: what is the use of the factual authorization of the Act and 
other statutory rules for regulating the collective agreement in specified 
cases, I could —in my opinion—correctly answer: the legislator indicated 
the main area for the regulation of the collective agreement, namely the 
area where he deemed necessary and possible the regulation of the collective 
agreement. But he did not want to exclude the possibility of the regulation 
in other events. This conclusion is supported by the general legislative 
practice, since we do not find in our legal system any example of the case 
in which a legal rule of higher grade would give a taxative enumeration of 
questions regulable in the sphere of the implementation, although all acts 
contain such reference. 
It would be, —however— incorrect to draw the ultimate conclusions 
exclusively from para. 10 of the Labour Code as a general rule of principle. 
A deeper study than given above need the casual authorizations of the 
Labour Code and other legal rules, too. Such authorizations —considering 
their character— can be listed into, two groups, in particular: 
-(a) obligatory regulation ordered by statutory rules, 
(b) a possibility of the regulation. 
ad (á) Such questions belong to the sphere of regulation compulsorily 
imposed on the collective agreement for which the statutory rules do not 
comprehend prescriptions or contain but general provisions not being 
usually applicable and being in want of completion. E.g. it is compulsory 
to. regulate in the collective agreement the timing of the working hours, 
the payment for overwork, the scheme of assignment of workers and 
work, the conditions of placing the workers on the payroll, etc. 
9 My view is in line with the opinion of László Nagy. Also according to him, 
"in cases w h e n . . . the regulation of a question belongs to the collective agree-
ment, the arrangement has to remain within the scope or rather limits deter-
mined by statutory rule." László Nagy: System and practice of the collective 
agreement 1971. P.15. 
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The questions belonging to this sphere may not be left unregulated, 
partly because the course of the application of law would stop, partly 
beecause the lack of some of such rules would violate fundamental rights 
of citizens, as e.g. the right to relaxation or the protection of mothers with 
small children. The provision of rule prescribing the regulation of certain 
questions in the collective agreement has always to be a factual and unam-
biguous authorization. 
The legislator referred to the second group of the content of the collec-
tive agreement in which the regulation is not binding, — such questions the 
regulation of which the legal rules completed but allow the divergence from 
that in the collective agreement in accordance with the conditions of the 
enterprise. Such possibilitiy is given by the legislator for the increase of the 
period for dismissal notice, for the deviation from the term fixed for the 
communication of timing the working hours, for setting forth a different 
pause in work, for enhancing in specified cases the rate of responsibility, 
etc. 
Should the parties concluding a collective agreement use such authoriza-
tion they make practically an exception to the rule of principle determined 
-in the statutory provision. Yet according to a correct interpretation of law 
a provision containing a divergence, exception if this means a deviation 
from an imperative rule, the collective agreement may not specify but in the 
event of an express authorization. This results unanimously from para. (3), 
Section 8 of the Labour Code. In line with this provision namely the collec-
tive agreement „may deviate from another statutory rule referring to the 
labour relation in only so far as this rule permits. A provision offending 
against such prohibition is void." Thus a rule of the collective agreement 
specifying a deviation, exception without a factual authorization shall be 
void. etaoih 
It follows from the foregoing that the concrete authorizations of statu-
tory rules concern only the provisions imperatively regulable as well as 
specifying a deviation of the collective agreement's content. 
It would be, however, inaccurate to assert that the collective agreement 
may not regulate other questions behind this scope. More provisions of the 
Labour Code contain relatively general elements needing an unambigous 
concretizing and interpretation with a view of an exact laying down the 
rights and obligations. A case in point is Section 13 of the Labour Code 
differentiating from the point of view of the use of trade union rights 
according as we are talking about questions concerning larger units of the 
enterprise or rather larger groups of the workers. Similar general elements 
are to be found in Section 35 of the Labour Code obligating the worker to 
temporarily perform duties not belonging to the sphere of his activities, as 
well as to provisionally work out of his permanent place of work and with 
other enterprises, too. In my submission, the law did not specify these rules 
more exact since it wanted to give possibilities to the enterprises for diffe-
rent interpretations proper to their specific conditions. We have to admit 
that the collective agreement with regard to such questions may concretize 
or rather construe the provisions of the statutory rules in fact a more 
detailed determination of these is expressly desirable. 
My view evolved so far according to which the content of the col-
lective agreement may exceed the cases of an expressed authorization given 
in statutory rules, practically is not contrary to the opinion set forth by 
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László Nagy. To my mind, too, those are the most characteristic instances of 
the possibility of a regulation in a collective agreement going beyond the 
authorization given in a statutory rule which are indicated by László Nagy, 
namely 1. concretizing general notions, 2. the determination of the measure 
of authorizatiion within the denotation "from-to" and 3. the definition of 
the principles of implementation. The difference of opinion consists in that 
while in my view the cases enumerated are merely typical and not exclusive 
instances of the regulation in a collective agreement, according to the opi-
nion of László Nagy there is not any possibility of regulation in a collective 
agreement beyond the cases set forth by him. By that he blocks up the 
enterprises and trade unions from the opportunities to construe the rules 
of the labour law and thus they would consider in vain necessary to regulate 
any question in the collective agreement, pursuant to this view they could 
not do that even if the rule was not contrary to the law — merely on the 
basis that there is no factual legal authorization and the question does not 
belong to any instance set forth by him. 
Such point of view narrowing down the content of the collective agre-
ement in this way —in my opinion— does not ensue either from the rules 
of the Labour Code, or from the economic-social conditions of the Act's 
coming into existence and particularly not from the function of the collec-
tive agreement. 
At last concernig the decision of the question how far the content of 
the collective agreement may exceed the sphere of the factual authorizations, 
significant ist the definition of the "enforcement principles" pursuant to para. 
(1) Section 10 of the Labour Code. 
It is not contested in the literature either that the collective agreement 
may specify the enforcement principles both of its own rules and of the 
statutory rules of higher grade. It remains to be seen what character the 
enforcement principles have, what demarcate such principles from the rights 
and obligations? 
László Nagy shows by some typical examples . what provisions were 
considered as such by the legislator: 
— the determination of the purpose of making use of the amounts al-
lotted to bonuses; 
— the realization of a certain rate of wages extension for factual groups 
of workers.10 
We meet also in the practice many times rules defining principles con-
tained in collective agreements, e.g.: 
— the principles of determining basic wages (placing on the pay-roll); 
— aspects to be applied on granting premiums, etc. 
The above-mentioned, indicates that also such rules impose obligations 
on one of the parties (mostly on the enterprise) and establish entitlements 
for the other. A difference between the rights and obligations as well as 
between the enforcement principles consits in the fact that on the side of 
the workers as entitled person is always the whole collective of the enter-
prise or a specific group of that (e.g. members of the old staff, workers 
concerned with energetics, workers showing a specific behaviour, etc.). The 
rule coming into being in this way has generally no individual obligee, such 
regulaton cannot be enforced by the individual. Yet the element of the 
enforcement is not absent from this specific rule, as a rule the power of 
«> László Nagy: System and practice of the collective agreement. I.P.10-12. 
[158 
enforcement in such cases belongs to the sphere of activities of the trade 
union organ representing the collective concerned. The trade union organ of 
the enterprise may object if the employer did not act in line with the 
principles established. Thus I cannot go along with the standpoint of László 
Nagy according to which the places the enforcement principles between the 
rule originating a right and the decision and does not consider them rules. 
Even as he expounds, the parties fix their agreements in the enforcement 
principles that "they should not fall into oblivion." Should we not treat such 
prescriptions of principle as other provisions of the collective agreement, 
doubts might arise e.g. whether Section 56 para. (3) of the Labour Code 
(and other similar rules of principle) are in fact legal rules. Pursuant to 
this provision namely on giving out the holiday "the wishes of the workers 
have to be taken into consideration in conformity with the possibilities." 
Thus this rule is no more than the enforcement principle for the enterprises 
of scheduling the holidays on government level. 
The enforcement principles fixable in the collective agreement — in my 
opinion — as to their legal nature practically do not differ from other 
norms. Since on principle such norms are permitted as to all questions, in 
line with the previously mentioned reasons the collective agreement dis-
poses of a general and not concrete authorization in questions bearing on 
the labour relation. 
Thus we can state from the discussion serving the construction of the 
questions regulable by the collective agreement the ultimate conclusion that 
the legal authorization facilitates the self-regulation of the enterprises jointly 
with the trade union and it is incorrect to attribute to the provisions of the 
Act such sense according to which those in specified factual cases "permit" 
the regulation in the collective agreement. I wish, however, to emphasize, as 
I deem inaccurate the interpretation of the rule exceedingly narrowing down 
the content of the collective agreement, at least as much I hold incorrect 
and harmful the other extreme view referring to the content of the collec-
tive agreement which considers everything regulable not arranged by law. 
In my opinion merely by deep analysis, with the use of all methods of 
the legal rule interpretation can be decided in individual cases upon whether 
a certain question may be regulated by the collective agreement and whet-
ther the enacted rule is lawful or unlawful. 
Jurisprudence and standpoints serving the formation of a uniform prac-
tice have to endeavour to help forward the parties concluding collective 
agreements with the correct construction of the law. A method of this could 
be the exploration of cases beyond the authorization of statutory rule con-
taining further possibilities of regulation. Parallel with this it is desirable 
to explore and analyze those covenants of the collective agreements exceed-
ing the opportunities given by statutory rules; covenants concerning ques-
tions for which —according to a correct interpretation of the legal rule— 
neither in a general nor in a cencrete form exists possibility of a regulation 
in the collective agreement. 
The formation of a correct practice in concluding collective agreements 
would serve the drafting of such uniform principles indicating the bounds and 
content limits of a regulation in collective agreements. Such principles to 
be applied are as follows: 
— the covenant of a collective agreement may not differ from the im-
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perative provisions of statutory rules but pursuant to a special authoriza-
tion; 
— the covenant may not go beyond the scope of movement even in the 
case of a permissive i.e. dispositive regulation of the statutory rule, 
— it may not contain provisions contrary to the basic principles of the 
labour law or our socialist legal system, 
— it may not contain such provisions giving less rights or more unfa-
vourable working conditions than those warranted by law. 
The feasible contents of the collective agreements secured by statutory 
rules on the basis of the above interpretation —in my opinion— makes the 
collective agreement suitable for the accomplishment of its function, for the 
task to fully and adequately define the rules of a reasonable and human 
association of human and material factors necessary to the producing activi-
ties of the enterprise as well as to make the workers interested in the 
successful operation of the enterprise. 
Summarizing our view we condider merely such covenants of the collec-
tive agreement void which offend against the provisions of the Labour Code 
or other statutory rule or differ from them without a specific authorization. 
Beyond this the parties concluding a collective agreement may regulate ail 
those questions necessary to facilitate an optimal operation of the enterprise 
in harmony with the purposes and principles of the law, to protect the in-
terest of the workers and to specify the rights and obligations of such parties 
more precisely.11 
11 As to the content range of the collective agreement, other authors, too, took 
sides in the literature. László Román construes para (1), Section 10 of the Labour 
Code in a way pursuant to which the. collective agreement may "move" within 
the limits specified by statutory rule. Though he does not reveal any detailed 
standpoint, also he delimits himself from the opinion which deems it possible that 
the collective agreement "may regulate everything not prohibited by the Labour 
Code or other statutory rules." László Román: The nature of the organization-like 
internal rules with special respect to the collective agreement. Studia, Pécs, 
1970.P.33. 
Also György Csanádi admits the possibility of a limitation of the regulation 
by the enterprise, but he puts the accent on the independence of the enterprises. 
To his view, beyend the imperative and differing rules of the collective agreement 
"it is not precluded that the collective agreement should regulate other questions, 
too, — those relative to which the statutory rule does not mention the regulative 
role of the collective agreement yet the regulation of which in the collective 
agreement the enterprise and the trade deem necessary." Such questions not 
arranged by statutory rule may have to be taken into consideration." 
György Csanádi: Labour Law. Educational Publisher. Budapest. 1972. P.63. 
László Nagy in his study prepared for the codification going on similarly 
advocates the enlargement of the content of the collective agreement. László 
Nagy: The system of the labour law regulation. Budapest, 1983. Manuscript P.20. 
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